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TRADE  DEPENDENCY,  BANCALNING  AND  EXTERNAL  DEBT 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the factors determining the effective  payment on outstanding debt 
in the presence of  partial defaults, and the feasibility  of  renewed investment. We show 
that the bargaining outcome, which determines the repayment, is dictated by the trade 
dependency,  as measured by the substitutability of  domestic  and  foreign  products. A 
higher  relative size  of sectors  with lower  substitutability between domestic  and foreign 
products will  increase the trade dependency of  the  nation,  reducing its  bargaining 
power  arid  thereby increasing the resource transfer  ceiling.  The  resultant  increase in 
the ceiling makes  the nation less risky,  increasing the willingness  of  creditors to lend. 
Thus, while a strategy  of  outward growth has the cost of  increasing trade dependency, 
it has the benefit  of  increasing the availability of  external finance.  Even with a partial 
default, investment in highly  trade dependent sectors with high productivity may be 
warranted.  This  investment can be implemented by  a  marginal relief of  the  present 
debt service,  in exchange for investment in the proper sector.  Following such a scheme 
may require a detailed  conditionality  as well as careful monitoring.  A way to partially 
overcome  some of the monitoring problems  is through direct investment. 
Joshua  Aizenman 
Economics Department 
The  klebrew University 
Jerusalem, 91905, 
ISRAEL INTRODUCTION  AND SUMMARY 
The  international credit market  is  presently characterized by the partial default 
of  several Latin American  nations  and  other developing countries. The partial default 
has triggered rounds  of  bargaining regarding  the  effective  repayment  called  for.  This 
bargaining has  yielded  refinancing packages  that come  with  certain  conditionalities 
attached  to them. Recently  much attention has been given  to the viability of  various 
smart  financing schemes to deal with  these  problems,  as  well  as  to  the  incentive 
problems generated by the partial default. Such literature has taken the view  that the 
obstacle  to  complete default  is  the presence of  default costs  stemming from  potential 
embargos  on  temporal and  intertemporal trade  (i.e., embargos on  trade in  goods  and 
trade in assets)1 
Most of  this literature  assumes  that the default costs are exogenous. While such 
an assumption is justified in the short run, in the intermediate run the costs of  defaults 
are endogenously determined by a nations trade dependency. This, in turn, is influenced 
by the investment policies of  the country. The purpose  of  this paper is  to focus on the 
lrnkages between trade dependency  and investment  policy.  We wish to investigate the 
consequence  of  investment policy on the bargaining  power  of  each party, and tO study 
the  role  of  conditonalty attached  to  renewed credit.  Specifically, we  would  like  to 
identify conditions under which renewed marginal resource transfer  would  be  beneficial 
1.  For an analysis of  country risk  see Harberger (1976), Kharas (1981),  Eaton 
and Gersovitz (1981), Sachs (1984), Kletzer  (1984), Dornbusch  (1984),  Krugman (1985), 
Smith  and  Cuddington  (1985),  Edwards (1985),  Folkerst-Landau (1985),  Diwan  and 
Donnenfeld  (1986), Dooley  (1986),  Aizenman (1986),  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1987),  Calvo 
(1987), Helpman (1987), Aizenman and Borensztein  (1987), Cole and English (1987), and 
Alesina and Tabellini (1987). for both parties, and to understand the role  of conditionality  and  direct investment in 
generating more favorable  growth prospects for the developing nations. 
We consider  an asymmetric world economy composed of  two  blocks  of  nations, 
the developing and the developed countries. The developed nations are characterized by 
a relative abundance of capital, implying  that the return on capital  in these developed 
countries tends to be lower  than that in developing countries.  Consequently,  country 
risk  considerations  aside,  developing  countries  offer  more  attractive  investment 
opportunities. Another important characteristic of  the developed natons is lower trade 
dependency (relative to that of the developing). 
A minimal model that allows the derivation of endogenous trade dependency is  a 
multi sectors, two periods model, in which the credit market behaves competitively in 
the absence  of default. However, a large initial debt overhang may motivate a partial 
default by the developing countries. The partial  default  will then initiate negotiations 
between the two  blocks of nations over the effective  repayment. The  threat associated 
with such bargaining  is that in the absence of  an agreement no international trade will 
occur. We apply this threat to derive the bargaining outcome  by using  the Nash  fixed 
threat bargaining framework. Therefore,  the  bargaining  outcome over the effective 
repayment  is  determined  by  the  trade  dependency of  the  nations  involved.  We 
investigate the factors  determining the  bargaining  outcome, and  identify conditions 
under which there exist opportunities  for Pareto imprOving investment, whose  return 
will be paid in the second period. In order to focus on the endogenous determination of 
the trade dependency of  the  developing  nations, we assume that  such  nations can 
produce  their  final  output  using  several  technologies  with  different  degrees  of 
substitutability between foreign and  domestic  intermediate products.  Thus,  the trade 
dependency  of developing nations is endogenously determined by the investment in the 
various sectors. 
The  bargaining outcome  defines  the  resource transfer ceiling  and  therefore 
determines under which conditions  we will switch from a competitive to a bargaining -3- 
equilibrium.  The resultant  rule  is simple:  if the resource transfer due to initial debt 
exceeds the resource transfer supported  by the bargaining outcome, the  country will 
choose to default partially, switching from the competitive to the bargaining allocation. 
We demonstrate that the bargaining  outcome is determined by the relative size  of 
the  various sectors.  A  higher relative  size  of  the sector with  lower  substitutability 
between foreign and domestic intermediate products will increase the trade dependency 
of  the  nation,  reducing its  bargaining  power  and  thereby  increasing the  resource 
transfer  ceiling.  The  resultant increase in  the  ceiling  makes  the  nation  less  risky, 
increasing the willingness  of  creditors to lend.  Thus,  although a  strategy  of  outward 
growth has the cost of increasing trade dependency,  it has the benefit  of increasing the 
availability of external finance. 
With substantial initial debt overhang we  will  observe  partial defaults and the 
elimination  of  voluntary  resource transfers  from the  developed  to  the  developing 
countries. We analyze the conditions  under which renewed marginal resource transfer 
to the developing countries may occur.  If there are no ways to commit the developing 
nations  to  follow  a specified investment plan, no new marginal resource transfer will 
occur.  The reason for this is that as long as we operate in the bargaining region,  the 
repayment  is  dictated by  the  bargaining  outcome.  From the  point  of  view  of  the 
developing nations it will be advantageous to apply any investment towards reducing 
their  trade  dependency.  Such an investment  will  be  beneficial  for  the  developed 
countries  for  two  reasons:  first,  the  developing  nations  will  reap  the  standard 
productivity gains;  second, the drop  in trade dependency will allow  them  to  cut the 
resources transferred to the developed nations. Obviously, the interests of the developed 
nations  will be served by minimin rig  investment in projects that reduce the trade 
dependency. 
Under plausible conditions  it may be beneficial for both blocks of nations to renew 
marginal resource transfers, under the condition  of targeting the investment in projects 
that  will  increase  the  trade  dependency  of  the  developing  countries.  Such  an investment  will  have  the  consequences  of  increasing the  future  resource transfer 
supported by the bargaining  outcome, allowing higher repayment in the future. 
We show that a strategy  of  reducing the resource transfer from the developing 
nations today, in exchange  for an equivalent increase in investment in the sectors that 
are highly trade dependent,  and the return in the future to the bargaining repayment, 
will benefit  the developing countries. Nevertheless,  this strategy is only the second best 
one  the  developing  nations  may choose,  since  their  interests  are  best  served  by 
targeting the investment to sectors that are less trade dependent, and thereby reducing 
their trade dependency.  Hence, the  fact  that the developing nations will  benefit  from 
investment n trade dependent sectors does not negate the need to impose conditionality 
to ensure the proper investment. 
From the eyes of the developed nations, they are trading off the marginal drop of 
repayment today against the increase in repayment tomorrow. If the increase n future 
repayment  is large enough,  the  developed nations will  be  better  off.  If  the marginal 
productivity of  capital  in the  developing  nations  is high  enough,  the beneficial  effect 
associated with the increase in future repayment generated by the investment  in the 
trade dependent  sector  will  justify a  renewed resource  transfer  (subject  to  the 
appropriate conditionality). 
A way to alleviate the monitoring problems associated with the  conditionality,  is 
to  execute the renewed resource  transfer  through  a  direct  investment.  Such  an 
investment  will  be  targeted  to  the  proper  sectors.  Consequently,  the  move  to  a 
bargaining regime brought about by a  partial default emphasizes the importance of 
direct investment as one  of  the few  remaining channels for external  finance of  new 
investments. In  this respect, it is  interesting to trace the path of  net  direct private 
investment  in  recent  years.  Findings  indicate that  the  volume  of  private  direct 
investment in the seven major borrowers2 remains significant even in recent  years, 
2.  Argentina,  Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines and Venezuela. -5- 
and  the  partial  default  of  these  countries  did  not  deter  marginal  investment3. 
Obviously,  the  relative  importance  of  direct  investment  as  a  channel  for  external 
finance has increased drastically due to the reduction of all other channels.  Thus, even 
in the presence of partial defaults,  selective direct investment may be  advantageous for 
both parties. 
This  paper  suggests  that  greater attention  should  be  given  to  policies  that 
encourage selective  direct investment as  a  way  to overcome the  incentive problems 
generated by  partial  defaults. These  incentive problems leave few  options  for  the 
renewal of  external finance for investment. The  developing countries can choose either 
to accept detailed conditionality attached  to the finance of  new investments,  or  to 
tolerate direct  private investment.  In  the  first case,  the  conditionality provides  the 
framework for monitoring. In  the  latter, the private  investor  does  the monitoring 
himself,  by  choosing  the  investment  projects.  While  none  of  these options  may be 
enthusiastically endorsed by the developing nations, they represent the few  remaining 
channels for external finance for renewed investment. 
Defore turning to the paper it  is  constructive to place it  in its proper context in 
the existing  literature. The incentive problems facing new investment in the presence of 
partial defaults have been analyzed by Krugman (1987), Froot  (1988)  and  other. The 
bargaining process  determining the repayment  on external  debt  is the  topic  of the 
Bulow and Rogoffs 1987 contribution.  The present paper  addresses  the strategic role of 
conditionality and  the incentive problems facing  new investment  in  a  multi-goods 
3.  The net direct private investment in these countries during 1979—1986  (in 
billion  dollar)  was  3.5,  4.4, 6.2,  4.3,  2.3, 2.5,  3.3, and  2.5. This information draws  on 
World Development  Reports  (1981-1988). For a useful discussion regarding the role and 
the experience with direct private investment in developing countries see Goidsbrough 
(1985). -6- 
economy,  where the  choice  between inward  versus  outward  growth  strategies  is 
relevant. 
1. THE  MODEL 
We describe the model by reviewing the production side, the preferences and the 
budget constraints. 
1.1  PRODUCTION 
International trade is trade in intermediate products, whose assembly to the final 
good is location specific. Consequently,  final goods are non-traded4. The final good can be 
either  consumed  or  invested domestically  to  increase the  future  capital  stock.  For 
example, consider the following production  function  of the final good 
(1)  Z5(X,Y;K) 
=  h[(X) + (y)E]/E (IKE)hi;  0  <  1  and  S  1 
where X and Y are the two types of intermediate  products (domestic  and foreign) and 
KE is the capital stock. Note that the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate 
products is given by  1/(1—s).  Our analysis will demonstrate  that this  elasticity is a 
useful measure of trade dependency:  a lower  value will be shown to correspond with a 
greater trade dependency. The term  h€ is a technological  coefficient.  We assume that 
the developing countries are more trade dependent relative to the developed  nations, 
and that they face a choice regarding their trade dependency.  Henceforth  we will refer 
to the sector producing ZE as sector 
4.  The supply  side is using  a framework similar to Ethier  (1982). In Ethiers 
model  the gains from trade stem  from  'international" returns to  scale.  These  scale 
economics are the result of an increase division  of labor (and other  inputs)  due to the 
rise in the market size. -7- 
A  way  of  characterizing this  situation  is  by  assuming that  the  developing 
countries have access to two technologies with different s, denoted by t  =  6; where 
6  1. The discussion is greatly simplified by assuming that the developed nations have 
access  to  a  production technology  that  allows  perfect  substitutability  between the 
various intermediate products, with  E  =  1.  We normalize productivity such that  the 
productivity coefficient for the developing country is unity (hence h€=i 
=  1). To focus on 
the role of substitution flexibility in determining the trade dependency, we suppose that 
all technologies share the same capital intensity (thus all have the same 
1.2 PREFERENCES AND THE DUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
The utility is given by the discounted value of  consumption of  the final  good. The 
preferences  of the two blocks of nations are summarized by the following  functions: 
(2)  U  = C1  + p  C2  U  = 
C1 
+ p  C2 
where C is the consumption at time t. 
We  assume that  the  intermediate  products are  produced using  a  Ricardian 
process and that there is a fixed supply of  labor in each country and no labor  mobility. 
We normalize units such that the supply  of intermediate products is equal  to  one in 
both blocks  of  nations. Thus,  X5  1,  and  Y5  =  1  where  X5  and  Y5  denotes the 
intermediate products produced by the developed and the developing block.  The use of X 
5.  While the key  insight  of  the paper carries  to  more general systems, the 
characteristics  of  the  solution  are  modified  if  we alter the above assumption. The 
concluding remarks to the paper (Section  4)  discuss how altering the above assumption 
will affect the solution. -8- 
and Y by developing countries at time t is  denoted  by X and Y  and the investment 
level  in  the  developing  and  the  developed  countries  is  denoted by  I and  11 
respectively. Thus,  the developed countries are using  1 - X and  1  - Y  of  the two 
intermediate products. The use of  the two intermediate products by industry  e  in  the 
developing countries (s  =  8  or  is denoted by X5t  and  Y5 .  The  periodic budget 
constraints are given by: 
(3)  C 
+ i= Z  C + I = Z 
(4)  X  X,t +X; 
=  +Y  X 
+  =  1;  + Yt = 1 
where 
(5) Z 
=  h[(X)  + (Y)n1 (K,t)' + h5[(X&t)5  + (Y)]'5 (K5) 
(6)  Z =  [1 - X + 1 - 
YtJ (Kt) 
We now focus our attention on the characterization of the global equilibrium. -9- 
2. THE  EQUILIBPJUM 
We  study  the  global  equilibrium by first  analyzing the  characteristics  of  the 
bargaining equilibrium.  This  equilibrium will  occur if  the  level  of  initial debt is  large 
enough. An understanding of the bargaining equilibrium  allows us to precisely define the 
threshold level of  debt that will trigger both a partial default  and will move us to the 
bargaining outcome.  And  by  understanding  the  bargaining  outcome  we can  easily 
characterize the properties  of  the competitive  equilibrium. 
2.1. THE  BARGAINING  REGIME 
Suppose that we start period one with a large initial debt due to be paid  to the 
developed nations, whose value is large enough to motivate a partial  default.  A  partial 
default will initiate a  renegotiations  between  the  two  blocks  of  nations. The  threat 
associated  with such  bargaining  is that in the absence of  an agreement no international 
trade will occur. The bargaining  outcome over the effective repayment is derived by the 
Nash  fixed  threat bargaining  framework6. We review the  bargaining  solution  in two 
steps.  First, we identify the allocations  that are Pareto efficient  (the contract  curve). 
Next, we  identify the bargaining solution  by finding the trading point  on the contract 
curve that maximizes the product of  the gains from  trade for both blocks of  nations. 
6.  For a discussion regarding the Nash fixed threat bargaining framework see 
Nash (1950) and Roth (1979). The solution  of this bargaining  problem  is  obtained  by the 
allocation  that maximizes the products of the trade gains for each party (relative to the 
fixed  threat allocation).  A  useful characteristic  of  the solution  is  that it is  a  Pareto 
efficient allocation (see Roth  (1979)). -  i_a  - 
The technical derivations of the solution are described  in the Appendix. Here we review 
the key results, starting with the case in which there is no new investment7. 
2.1.1. THE PARETO EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS 
Pareto efficiency is characterized by an allocation  where all use equal  quantitIes 
of both intermediate goods (i.e., X =  Y and X4  =  Y*)8. 
For a given X the Appendix shows that the efficient allocation is given by: 
(7)  (1 





K2  +5K52 
for  /(1 - )  (h)1"'  (for  ,8);  and 
7.  This  assumption is justified as the  benchmark case,  in which we assume 
that the two blocks of nations have reached their  desired closed economy capital stock. 
Such a level is determined by the rates of time preference,  as given by (p,p*). In  order 
for further investment to equate the marginal product across the two blocks of nations, 
capital mobility will be required  Our analysis in section 3  will more closely  examine 
the potential role of investment in the presence of partial default. 
8.  The  Appendix  shows  that,  because both intermediate  goods  are  perfect 
substitutes in the production process  of  the developed nations,  in a Pareto allocation 
the jnarginal product of both X  and  Y  should  be equal  for all activities.  This  result, 
coupled  with the assumption that the global supply of  each  intermediate product is 
equal to one, implies that X  =  Y and X -  11 - 
(8)  Xe=Ye  X*=Y*Xs+X  Ys+Y. 
Note that (7) implies that the division of intermediate inputs between sectors S and  is 
determined by the relative share of  the  effective capital  (si), obtained by weighting 
the capital stock by 2  (for t =  8,i. The properties of the Pareto allocation  Imply 
that for a given  X we can  completely characterze the solution by equation (7) and (8), 
Consequently,  we can view the bargaining  as a process determining X. 
2.2.2 THE DEFAULT DECISION 
It is noteworthy that since  X  and  '{  are  perfect substitutes in the production 
process  of  the developed nations, a free trade, competitive equilibrium is  characterized 
by a unitary terms of trade. Let us denote  by  R  the resources- to be transferred  to the 
developed  nations due to  existing  debt  (a  negative value  of  R  will correspond to  a 
resource transfer  to the developing countries). In the absence of default, the exports of 
the developing nations finance the imports and the transfer to the developed nations: 
(9)  1_Y*1_X+R, 
Applying the property of the Pareto allocation, where X  =  1 - Y, we derive that 
(9')  R=  2X-1 
A  default will move us to the bargaining regime, yielding  an allocation  that is 
characterized by a level of X denoted by Xb. The equal proportions  of X and Y  in all the 
activities imply that Xb is fully characterizing the system  and the developing nations -  12 - 
use  [Xb  ,  ]  = [1 - Xb .1 - XbJ  The  bargaining  allocation is obtained by the exchange 
of  1  -  Xb  units of  the developed countries intermediate product with  Xb  units of  ths 
developing countries intermediate product.  Thus, the bargaining allocation  is equivalent 
to a competitive allocation in which the resource transfer is given by Rb  =  2Xb - 1. The 
term Rb defines the effective  ceiling on repayment: if the repayment due exceeds Rb the 
developing  nations  will  prefer  to  default  partially,  arid  will  transfer  only  Rb. 
Consequently,  one  can  view  Xb  as  the  key  variable  in  determining  the  smooth 
functioning  of  the international credit market. A  larger Xb is associated  with a world 
system  that will  allow  greater  capital  flows from the  developing  to  the  developed 
countries. 
We can summarize this insight with the help of  an  Edgeworth  Box  diagram (see 
Figure  1), whose dimensions  are given by the global  endowment of  X  and  Y,  where 0 
and 0* denotes the origin  of  the developed and the developing countries, respectively. 
The diagonal  00*  describes  the Pareto  allocations9.  The  line  T0*  corresponds to  the 
repayment  schedule,  defined  by  (9).  A  competitive allocation  A corresponds  to  a 
repayment  of  R (measured by the vertical  bold  line).  Suppose  that  the bargaining 
allocation  is given by the point Ab,  corresponding  to  X  =  Xb.  The  resource transfer 
ceiling  is  Rb,  and the  feasible  range  of  competitive free  trade  equilibria  with  full 
integration of  capital markets  is  given by those X to the left  of  Xb,  in which the 
repayment due is R, with R <  Rb. The precise location  of  the free trade equilibrium is 
characterized by the desirable level  of  resource transfer.  In the absence of  resource 
transfer, the equilibrium  will occur at the point  A0,  where X  =  .5,  Y  =  .5.  A  resource 
transfer to the developing nations will imply an equilibrium  to the left of A0 
Note that in a two  periods  world with  no uncertainty,  the maximum  level  of 
credit to the developing nations that could be allocated equals the discounted value of 
9.  Curves ZZ  (Z*Z*)  describe  allocations  that yield a constant  output  in  the 




x- 13 - 
the  second period transfer resource ceding (i.e.  Rb2/(1 
+  r), where r is  the  iendert 
interest rate, and Rb2 is the second period resource transfer ceiling).  The  purpose of the 
next  section  is  to characterize Xb, and to demonstrate that it  is directly tied  to  the 
trade dependency  of the developing countries. 
2.2.3.  THE  BARGAINING  EQUILIBRIUM 
We now turn to the characterization of  the bargaining equilibrium.  We adapt the 
framework  of  the  fixed  threat  Nash  equilibrium.  The  bargaining  allocation  is 
characterized by the X value that maximizes  the products of the gains from  trade. Let 
us denote by Z(X)  and Z(X4) the production  level  of  the developed and the developing 
nations that is generated with an allocation of (X, X*). Note that the autarky production 
level  of  the  developed  and  the  developing  nations is  given by  Z(1)  and  Z*(0).  The 
bargaining  allocation Xb is found by solving: 
(10)  MAX  [Z(X) - Z(1)] [Z(1 - X) - Z*(0)1 
X 
We start by considering the case where  <  0 <  6  1.  The  Appendix demonstrates 
that: 
(11)  Z(1)  K  ;  Z(X) = (2X) 
(12)  Z*(0)  =  h5K5  Z*(i. - X)  =  (1 
— X) -r 
where 
-J6 
(13)  -t  =  2  +  6K5 2 - 14 - 
We can apply (11)—(12)  to (10), taking a logarithmic  transformation, obtaining that Xb 
the solution  of10: 
(14)  MAX  ln[(2X) - ii + mt (1< {  - 1] 
The two terms measure the percentage increase in the production  (relative to autarky) 
of  the developed and developing countries, respectively.  Note that the gains from trade 
for the  developing  nations depend  positively  on  T/K5.  Inspection  of  (13)  reveals that 
t/K5 depends  positively on the capital ratio in the sector  with the low substitutability 
relative to the high substitutability (i.e., on K/K5). The rational for this outcome is that 
in  autarky only sector  6  is producing.  Sector  is  ideal,  because it  can  not  produce 
without Imports  of  X. Consequently,  the gains from  trade are greater for sector  than 
for sector 8, and these gains are tied to the relative size  of sector f , as measured by the 
K/K5 ratio. 
Maximizing (14) yields the following first order condition: 
r T ' 
(15)  =  tJ 
X2-X 
10.  Henceforth we restrict  our attention to the bargaining  region in which there 
are gains from trade for both nations. In terms of (14) we assume that 
h5K5  (i_)/  .5  <  X  <  1 
— 
C  }  Note  that  from the  definition  of  T  it  follows  that 
1  -  h5K5 - 15  - 
The left  side  measures the  percentage increase  in  the  developed nations  gains 
from  trade that s associated  with a marginal increase of X, and is  described by curve 
DD  (Figure  2).  The  right side measures the  percentage loss  in  the developing  nation 
gains from trade associated with a marginal increase in X, and is described  by schedule 
GG. The feasible bargaining  range is given by the shaded values of X (Figure  2), and the 
intersection of  both schedules gives the bargaining outcome  (Xb).  At  this allocation  a 
marginal transfer of X will cause percentage  losses of the gains from trade to one party 
that equal the percentage gains to the other party. 
The  relative size  of  the  two  sectors  plays a  key  role  in  determining both the 
bargaining outcome and the riskiness of  the developing countries  (as measured by the 
feasible region  of  no default).  A  greater trade dependency is associated  with a higher 
relative size of  the sector with lower  elasticity of  substitution. Basically, higher  Ke/Ks 
ratios are associated with a raise in  ,  and an increase in the gains from  trade  of  the 
developing nations.  In terms of Figure  2, a higher  K/K5 ratio will shift GG  downwards 
and rightwards, to GG,  increasing  the bargaining  solution  from  Xb  to Xb.  In  terms  of 
Figure  1,  the resultant increase in Xb will raise the range of  no default,  increasing  the 
resource transfer ceiling from Rb to Rb 
The insight behind  these results is clear: a higher relative size of  the sector that is 
more trade dependent increases the bargaining  power  of the developed nations, thereby 
increasing their  willingness  to  supply  credit,  and  reducing the  tendency  of  the 
developing countries to default. Thus, while a strategy of outward growth has the cost 
of  increasing the  trade  dependency,  it has the  benefit  of  increasing the  resource 
transfer ceiling as well as the availability of external finance12. 
11.  A formal proof that  >  0 is given in Appendix A.2. 
12.  A potential cost of  trade dependency  is the increase of  the vulnerability of 
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Our analysis has demonstrated that a useful measure of  trade dependency is  the 
elasticity of  substitution between the foreign and the domestic  intermediate products 
where lower substitutability is associated with a greater trade dependency.  While here 
we have considered the case in which the elasticity  of substitution is above unity in one 
sector (sector  5)  and  below  unity  in  the  second  sector  (sector ),  the  Appendix 
demonstrates that the same result holds  true for the case  in which the  elasticity of 
substitution in both sectors exceeds unity13. 
our  model,  we  focus  on  the case  where the move to  the  bargaining  equilibrium is 
determined by the will  of  the developing nations.  In a more  symmetric environment, 
the  move to the  bargaining  equilibrium may be  also  determined by  the  developed 
nations.  A  higher  trade  dependency of  the  developing  nations  may increase their 
vulnerability to such policies.  In analyzing the  consequences  of  external productivity 
shocks  the addition  of  explicit  uncertainty  is  required. Section  4  review  such an 
extension. 
13.  The case  in which  the  elasticity of  substitution is  below unity  for  both 
sectors corresponds  to the case in which in the absence of trade,  output is zero  in the 
developing  nations.  It  can  be  shown  that in  this  case  the  bargaining  outcome  is 
independent of the relative size  of both sectors.  Because  this  case  corresponds  to  the 
implausible  outcome  (that  output  is zero in the absence of international trade)  our 
analysis ignores this possibility. -  17 
3.  PARTIAL DEFAULTS, CONDITIONALITY  AND  DIRECT  iNVESTMENT 
Suppose that we start period one with substantial debt  overhang, implying  that 
we are in the partial default  region, in which the effective  repayment is given by the 
bargaining outcome,  Rb.  This  situation s characterized  by  the elimination of  any 
voluntary resource transfers  from  the developed to the developing countries.  We now 
examine the conditions  under which renewed investment in the  developing countries 
may occur. 
If  there are  no  ways  to  commit the  developing nations to  follow  a  specified 
investment plan,  no new marginal resource transfer will occur.  The reason for this is 
that as long  as we operate in the bargaining region,  the repayment is dictated by the 
bargainrng outcome.  From the point  of  view  of  the  developing  nations  it  will  be 
advantageous to apply any investment towards reducing their trade dependency.  Such 
an investment will be beneficial for the developed countries for two reasons.  First, they 
will receive the standard productivity gains;  second, the drop in trade dependency  will 
allow the developing nations to cut the resources  transferred to the developed nations. 
Obviously, the interests  of  the developed nations  will  be  best  served by minimizing 
investment in projects that reduce the trade dependency. 
If there are credible ways to commit the developing countries to follow a specified 
investment  policy, then it  may  be  beneficial  for  both  blocks  of  nations  to  renew 
marginal resource transfers, with the condition  of  targeting the investment in projects 
that will increase the trade dependency of the developing countries. This may occur if 
the developed nations agree to cut the resource transferred today below Rb, in exchange 
for an investment in the sector that is highly trade dependent. Such an investment will 
have  the  consequences  of  increasing the  future resource transfer  from  Rb  to  Rb, 
allowing higher repayment in the future. The modified budget constraint is now 18 
(9)  Y  =  1 - X + Rb - 
where the  developed nations agree to  reduce the effective  present resource transfer 
below the bargaining  solution, to  =  Rb - 
is.. In exchange, the developing nations are 
investing the marginal product of I in  the trade  dependent sector (f)  today, and 
returning to the  (new) bargaining solution,  with a  resource transfer  of  Rb  ,  in  the 
future. Note that in the new equilibrium  we still observe  Y = X, implying that 
(16)  X1  = (1  + Rb- l)/2; 
=  (1 
Let us evaluate the conditions under which such a transaction will increase the welfare 
of both parties. Note that from the point of  view of  the developing countries Z1  stays 
intact in the present, while Z2  is affected  by two factors. First, the present investment 
increases the capital stock in sector ,  raising  the effective capital stock ('r)  and thereby 
raising future  output. Second, the increase in Rb, resulting from the investment in the 
trade  dependent sector, will  increase the  resource transfer  in  the  future,  thereby 
reducing the future X and the future output. Applying  (12) we can  summarize these 
two factors by: 
1—n  0-r 
(17)  -  = 
Z2 I -- 
- 
The  first  term  on  the  left  side  of  (17)  is  positive,  and  measures  the  enhanced 
productivity effect due to the accumulation of capital. The second term  is negative, and 
reflects the increase in trade dependency,  with the result of reducing future production 
due to the increase in  the resource transfer  ceiling (Rb).  Appendix  A.2  demonstrates -  19 - 
that the first  positive effect dominates, and the developing nations are better off with 
the renewed investment. Therefore,  a strategy of reducing the present resource transfer 
from  the developing nations,  in exchange  for an equivalent increase in  investment in 
sector  (the sector that is  more  trade dependent),  and the return in period two  to the 
bargaining  repayment (with repayment Rb) will benefit the developing countries. 
While the outcome for the developing nations is clearly favorable, the outcome  for 
the  developed  nations is  ambiguous.  First  period  production goes  down  by  MP  I 
(where MP  is the marginal product of Xl, whereas second period production  goes  up by 
MPx7It  Thus, the gross return attributed  to  this policy is  given by the marginal 
consequence  of the investment on the resource ceiling: 
Z2  Xb 
(18) 
14 
The Appendix demonstrates that  is positive  and proportional  to 1/'r  .  Recalling 
(13),  't is a measure of  the developing countries capital stock.  It follows  that lIT is  a 
measure of capital scarcity in the developing countries. 
As seen by the developed nations, they trade of f the marginal drop of  repayment 
today against the increase in repayment tomorrow,  If the increase in future repayment 
is  large  enough,  the  developed  nations  will  be  better  off,  as  will  be  the  case  with 
countries  where capital is scarce. 
It  IS  worth noting  that the strategy of investing in  a  highly  trade  dependent 
secto'- s only the second best  for the developing nations.  Their interests are best  served 
14.  See Appendix A2, equation (A18), - 20 - 
by targeting  the investment in activity  8  (the  sector  that is  less  trade  dependent), 
thereby  reducing their  trade  dependency15.  Obviously,  with  such  a  strategy  the 
developed nations  are always worse  off16. Hence, the fact that the developing nations 
will benefit  from  investment in trade dependent sectors does  not negate the  need to 
impose conditionality  to ensure proper investment in the more trade dependent sector. 
A way to alleviate some  of the problems  associated with setting the conditionality 
for the proper use of  funds, is to execute the renewed resource transfer through direct 
investment. Such investment will be targeted to the proper sector, and may avoid some 
of  the monitoring issues. Therefore,  we may conclude  that the  move to a  bargaining 
regime  due  to  a  partial  default  put  greater  weight on  the importance  of  direct 
investment as one of the few  remaining channels for external finance of  investment in 
15.  In terms of  equation (17)  the second term  is  positive  if  the investment is 




16.  In terms of (18), —-  <  0 and therefore the developed nations are worse of 
a18 
if investment  is  targeted towards a reduction in trade dependency of  the developing 
nations. Thus, such  type of investment must be domestically  financed. If there are no 
strategic restrictions on inward investment, the debtor will invest in sector  8 until the 
marginal gain in future output equals  the domestic real interest  rate. The first order 
condition for optimal investment in sector 8 is that  1  r*,  where r  is the 
debtor  real interest  rate.  The scarcity of  capital and  high real interest  rates in  the 
developing countries limit the feasibility of  inward investment. Conditionality,  coupled 
with  external  financing  of  investment in the trade  dependent sectors  may impose 
another obstacle to inward investment. - 21.  - 
thedeveloping  nations. The incentive problems that characterize the bargaining  regime 
in the presence of partial defaults leave few options  for the renewal of  external finance 
for  investment.  The  developing  countries  can  choose  either  to  accept  detailed 
conditionality  attached to the finance of  new investments, or to tolerate direct private 
investment. In the first case,  the conditionality  provides the framework for monitoring. 
In the latter, the  private  investor  does  the  monitoring himself,  by  choosing  the 
investment projects.  While none of  these options may be  enthusiastically endorsed by 
the developing nations, they represent the few remaining channels for external finance 
for renewed investment. 
4. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
A key result derived  in this paper is  that the trade dependency determines the 
bargaining  outcome  regarding the  repayment associated  with a partial  default.  Even 
with  a  partial  default,  investment  in  highly  trade  dependent  sectors  with  high 
productivity may be  warranted. This  investment may be  implemented by a marginal 
relief  of  the debt  service today in exchange  for the  investment in  the  proper sector. 
Following such  a scheme  may require detailed  conditionality and  close  monitoring.  A 
way  to  partially  overcome  some  of  the  monitoring  problems  is  through  direct 
investment. We close the paper with remarks concerning extensions and qualifications. 
While  we  assumed  there  was  no  uncertainty,  it  could  be  added  without 
difficulties. For example,  stochastic productivity of  intermediate products will  make the 
dimensions  of the Edgeworth  Box in Figure 1  random, but the logic  of  our analysis will 
stay intact17.  An interesting result obtained in the paper is that the bargaining  solution 
depends only on the capital  ratio among  the various activities,  and not on the absolute 
level of  capital. This result is related to the functional  specification,  which assumes a 
17.  The contract curve  is the 45 ray starting from 0. It  can  be  shown  that 
productivity shocks affecting Y and X5 will make  the corresponding  repayment ceiling 
Rb  random. - 22 
— 
unitary elasticity of  substitution between the  aggregat  intermediate  product and 
capital,  and dose not  hold  for a general  elasticity of  substitution. Another  simplifying 
assumption applied throughout the analysis. s that the developed nations have access 
to  a  production  technology  that  allows  perfect  substitutability  between the  various 
intermediate products. This assumption generated a simple solution where the contract 
curve is a straight line. Abandoning this assumption  will generate a non-linear contract 
curve. Such modification may be important in the presence of  systematic uncertainty, 
because different levels of  trade dependency  will  affect  the trade off  (and the relative 
price) of foreign and domestic products. - 23 - 
APPENDIX 
The purpose  of this Appendix is to derive  some of  the key results reported in the 
text.  Appendix A.1 reviews the derivations of the bargaining  outcome, and Appendix A.2 
analyzes the role of marginal investment and conditionality. 
A.1  THE  BARGAINING  OUTCOME 
A  useful characteristic  of  the  bargaining  outcome  in  the  Nash  fixed  threat 
framework (s  that it  is  Pareto  efficient  (see Roth  (1979)). We  start the  analysis  by 
deriving the characteristics of the contract curve, defined by the Pareto efficient points. 
Thus, a point on the contract curve is  defined by an allocation  of  X  and Y  among the 
various activities that maximize the global  weighted average of output. Therefor,  for a 
given cu, 0  K  1 we maximize: 
(Al) 
Equivalently  maximizing 
(A2)  [l - X 
+ 1 - Y] (Kt)t  + (1 -  (h{(Xt) + ()5]  (K)'  + 
hs[(X - X,)8 + (Y - Y,)'6 (K6t)1). 
The weight w corresponds to the relative importance attached to the developed nations, 
and varying it will  move us along the contract curve. Direct optimization (with respect 
to  X  X; and  gives us the following first order conditions: 
(A3)  w[1. -  + 1 -  (Kt)' = (1 - w)(h&[Qs1'1(X - X)1  (K&,t)1'} - 24 - 
(A4)  ()[1 -  +  1 -  (Kt)1 =  (1 - W)(hss]'(Y Y)  (K5)') 
(A5)  h[Q11 lKt)' (Xt)' = h55]1 (Ktt)1 (X 
- 
(A6)  h5[Q]1 (K5t)' et)'  = h[Q]1  (K5t)'  - Y) 
where E  (Xt)5 + (5)5  for  =  ,8. 
Taking the ratio of (A3) and fA4) yields that 
(A7)  -  =  - Y,t 
Takrng the ratio of (AS) and (A6)  yields that 
(A8)  (X5t/Yt)' 
=  [(X 
- Xt)/(Yt 
- 
Applying (A7) and (4) to (A8) yields that 
(AS)  Xtt  =  5,t; 
=  =  = Yt 
We can  apply (A7)  and (A9)  to  (AS),  replacing the terms  involving  Y  with  the 
terms involving X. Solving the resulting equation for X  yields (7) in the text. 
Applying equation (7) to (5) yields the result reported in  (12) regarding Z*(1 - X). 
The autarky output for the case where  <  0  5 s  1, is obtained by noting that for the ' 
process both inputs must be used in order to produce anything. Thus, in autarky only 
the S process is employed, yielding the Z*(0) in (12). - 25 - 
We noi turn to an overiiew of  the bargaining  problem  for the case  where the 
elasticity of  substitution excess one for both processes- If the elasticity of  substitution 
exceeds one in both activities (i.e. if  U  e  6  <  1) then the autarky output is obtained 
by choosing  that maximize  the following  expression: 
(Alo)  he(Yt) (Kt)1 +  h5(l -  (K6t)1 
yielding that the autarky level of Y  and the corresponding  autarky output are 
(All)  's,t = ss  /(Ke + 
(A12)  Z(O)  =  (heK 
In solving the bargaining outcome  for the case  where 0  6  s  1, we follow the 
steps described in (14)-(15), adjusting for the new value of Z*(0), and obtaining that the 
modified equations  are 
(14)  MAX  ln[(2X)-  1]  + ln[ (1 - X) { (K+K( 
f  T 
=  '1hK+h5K5J 
(1 
X2—X'  T  (1_X){g}  (lX)1 -  26  - 
1  T 
Note that (14) and (15) can  be  obtained  from (14)  and (15) by replacing 
T 
with  Consequently,  it  follows  that  the  discussion  regarding  the 
determination  of  Xb  and  Figures  1-2  continue  to  hold  true  for  this  case.  Direct 
derivation reveals that: 
(A13)  sign a (K5+6K5) / G  = sign ( S - }  0. 
-r 
Thus, investment in the sector that is more  trade dependent  will increase  ii5r6 
shifting schedule  GO  (Figure 1) rightwards, implying  that Xb will go up. 
A.2  MARGINAL INVESTMENT AND CONDITIONALITY 
We now turn to the derivations of the results reported in section  3. Let us denote 
5K5  t- 
by H  the term [  }  . Applying this notation we can rewrite the condition defining 
Xb  (equation 15) by 
- (Xb)' 2  1 - Xb - (1 - Xb)' H 
From which we derive that 
(A14)  =  (1-)(1-X)H 
T 
Notice that the bargaining  equilibrium must  involve  gains from  trade for both 
parties, therefor Xb must satisfy the following: (A15)  .5  X  1 -  H 1/ 
Applying this information to  (A14)  w€ find  that  >  0.  Observe that from 
definitions it follow  that: 
aT  ...  aXb  axb  aT 
(A16)  =  h  2  and  — = 
0  IT  0 
alt 
Applying (A16) and (A14) to (17) we obtain that: 
ac  /t  (i)C;  2-(1-X)K -( 1-)(X2) 
(A17)  —  =  h52  T  2-(1-)(1-X) H-(1-) (X2Y 
Inspection of (A17) reveals that the conditions given in (AlS) ensure that —  >  0. 
Finally, note that by combining (A14) and (A16) we conclude  that 
IXb  1 
(A18)  =  f(K/K5) 
where f is a proportionality  factor that is a function only of the capital ratio (and not of 
the absolute  level of capital). Note that from  the definition of T (see (13)) it follows that 
T  is a  measure of  the capital  level  in  the developing countries. Consequently,  (A18) 
implies  that the larger the scarcity of  capital in the developing economies, the greater 
the marginal effect of investment on the Xb  and the transfer ceiling. - 28  - 
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